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Comparative Institutional Analysis and Detainee
Legal Policies: Democracy as a Friction, Not a Fiction
I. INTRODUCTION
When the development of legal policies regarding detainees
during the war on terror is viewed uncritically, it is easy to
understand the cynicism surrounding it. Although U.S. officials have
asserted that these detentions were ultimately necessary for the
preservation of democracy, legal pronouncements often seemed far
more hegemonic.1 Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the
system of checks-and-balances appeared to have been overdrawn by
the executive, and neither the legislature nor the judiciary was eager
to immediately intervene to limit the perceived presidential
overreach.2 When the Supreme Court finally did, its efforts were
viewed by some as attempts to seize authority vested by the
Constitution in the President or legislature.3 The issue of detentions
during the war on terror quickly spiraled into “only one more
1. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security: Our
Security, Our Values (May 21, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/) (“[T]he decisions that were made over the last eight years established . . . a framework that failed to rely on
our legal traditions and time-tested institutions, and that failed to use our values as a
compass.”); JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL
RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR x (2007) (“As patriots of democratic freedom
understand, [actions by the Bush administration] threaten our democracy and the rule of
law.”); ALASDAIR ROBERTS, THE COLLAPSE OF FORTRESS BUSH: THE CRISIS OF AUTHORITY
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 3 (2008) (citation omitted) (noting that in the United States,
“the Bush administration was alleged to have launched a ‘rolling coup’ against the U.S.
Constitution”).
2. In fact, one scholar has asserted that “[t]he bias towards aggressive action . . . is not
unique to the executive. Legislators must appear responsive to the life and property interests of
citizens. In the four months following 9/11, 97 percent of all bills, resolutions, and
amendments proposed by Congress . . . were related to terrorism.” Laura K. Donohue, The
Perilous Dialogue, 97 CAL. L. REV. 357, 370 (2009) (citations omitted).
3. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2279 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the majority’s decision was “not really about the detainees at all,
but about control of federal policy”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“For this Court to create such a monstrous scheme [of habeas corpus review for
foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay] in time of war . . . is judicial adventurism of the
worst sort.”); John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 574 (2006) (arguing that
the Court “unwisely injected itself into military matters” and “press[ed] the federal courts far
beyond their normal areas of expertise”).
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episode in the never-ending tension between the President exercising
executive authority . . . and the Constitution,” which “embodies
some sort of system of checks and balances.”4 The problem was,
though, that no one within the government seemed to be sorting
out precisely what sort of checks and balances system was necessary.
In light of these institutional tensions, it is no wonder that some
have questioned whether the three branches of government even
shared the same end-goal of preserving democracy.5 Arguably,
however, this institutional friction is as much an example of what is
right with a constitutional democracy as it is of what is wrong with
it. Created in this case by the exigencies of war, this tension often
arises when the Constitution does not explicitly delegate to any one
branch exclusive authority to act, and consequently each branch
assumes that it must intervene in order to preserve fundamental
rights.6 The trouble is that “[a] society intent on achieving the
highest liberty for all runs smack into a basic institutional quandary:
liberty requires both protection by the government and protection
from the government.”7
This problem and the concomitant challenge of “deciding who
decides”8—particularly as pertaining to detainee issues during the
war on terror—is the focus of this Comment. Admittedly, the study
of institutional choice is not novel,9 nor are more general inquiries
into which branch of government has the institutional competency

4. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981) (emphasis added).
5. See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); Nadine Strossen,
American Exceptionalism, the War on Terror, and the Rule of Law in the Islamic World, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 495 (2009) (“[T]he ‘War on Terror’ has violated . . .
fundamental precepts of the Federalist Society in numerous ways, with devastating
consequences for liberty, democracy, and national security alike.”).
6. See Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic State: Congressional
Intelligence Oversight, 81 TUL. L. REV. 721, 724 (2007).
7. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 43 (1994); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This case brings into conflict the competing demands of
national security and our citizens’ constitutional right to personal liberty.”).
8. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 3.
9. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle
for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225 (2005);
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 106–14 (2009); Adrian Vermeule,
Judicial Review and Institutional Choice, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1557 (2002).
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to address particular vexing questions.10 But, as explained more fully
below, existing scholarship has failed to provide comprehensive
answers regarding how and when power ought to be allocated
between, and exercised by, the government’s three branches.11 For
the most part, these failings have occurred because the executive,
legislature, and judiciary are too often viewed as simplistic,
frictionless institutions.12 In recognition of this shortfall, Neil
Komesar, a prominent law and public policy scholar, has proposed a
novel analytic approach to examine institutions comparatively and
determine when intervention by one branch over another would
offer a superior outcome.13 Though Komesar’s focus has not been
directed specifically on the war on terror, his theory nevertheless
provides a potential resolution to the issues surrounding the
institutional tensions that have arisen within that context.
This Comment thus explores institutional frictions and the
development of legal policies related to detainee issues within the
framework of Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis theory. In
order to understand the value of comparative institutional analysis,
Part II discusses previous attempts to determine “who decides” and
explains why these theories have failed to fully resolve the problem of
how and when decision-making power should be allocated to any
specific branch of government. Part III explains Komesar’s
comparative institutional analysis theory, and highlights ways in
which this approach fills the gaps left by previous theories. Part IV
applies Komesar’s theory to the institutional frictions that arose as
detainee policies were created by the U.S. government. Part V
concludes with the proposition that applying comparative
institutional analysis to post-9/11 legal policies highlights the
theory’s utility and can also serve to alleviate cynicism related to the
development of law during times of crisis.

10. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence of Juries:
Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1255
(1996); Michael H. Page, Judging Without the Facts: A Schematic for Reviewing State Secrets
Privilege Claims, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1243, 1267–75 (2008).
11. See KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 233.
12. Id. at 39.
13. See id. at ix–x.
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II. PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO “DECIDE WHO DECIDES”
Because the Constitution is often vague as to how and when any
particular branch of government may intervene into a particular
issue, scholars have proposed a number of disparate approaches to
resolve these questions. Most prominently, these have included
attempts to assign power based on original intent, the protection of
fundamental rights, law and economics, or institutional choice.
Unfortunately, as the following survey reveals, though these efforts
have provided some insight into the issue of who decides, each has
failed to yield a wholly satisfactory answer.
A. Original Intent
Essentially, proponents of an original intent approach to
allocation of powers suggest that deciding who decides ought to be
done in accord with the intent of the Constitution’s Framers.14
Adherents claim this is necessary because the Framers themselves
ratified the Constitution with such a presupposition and expected
their intent to inform future decision-making processes.15 Under this
approach, proposals to vest authority in any particular branch based
on the belief that it would be best suited to apply a philosophical or
moral theory are generally rejected.16 “Thus, for example, although
the Constitution emerged in the general context of modern natural
rights theory, most originalists deny that the judiciary is therefore
legitimately enabled to invoke such theory for creating rights beyond
those enumerated in the document.”17 Instead, the original intent
approach would suggest that the choice as to which institution
should make a particular decision was decided long ago—by the
Framers of the Constitution.18
Though original intent certainly has influenced modern
constitutional theory,19 its assumptions have been questioned and,
14. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 886 (1985).
15. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 365–66 (1977).
16. JOHNATHAN GEORGE O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 2 (2005).
17. Id. (citation omitted).
18. See KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 197.
19. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 15, at 364 (arguing that theories beyond original
intent constitute judicial attempts “to revise the Constitution”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:
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perhaps more importantly, its practical application has often fallen
flat. Scholars assert, for example, that historical evidence does not
support the notion that the Framers wished to impose their intent in
perpetuity.20 Moreover, even if they did, the fact remains that
“original intent” is not always discoverable.21 Difficulties related to
ambiguities of language and the enterprise nature of the
Constitution’s drafting make discerning intent nearly (if not entirely)
impossible.22 More to the point, as pertaining to allocation of
decision-making powers, “[t]he brief text of the Constitution offers
little detail on specific substantive outcomes or even on institutional
allocation; most of the detailed provisions in the Constitution
concern institutional design.”23 In the end, therefore, while original
intent may offer a starting point as to how decision-making authority
should be divided amongst the branches, it fails to offer a completely
cogent approach.
B. Protection of Fundamental Rights
In contrast to the original intent approach, proponents of
fundamental rights analysis suggest that the desire to protect certain
essential values, such as equality, liberty, and justice, ought to drive
determinations about which branch should be allocated decisionmaking powers.24 As used in the present context, the fundamental
rights approach entails determining which branch of government
could best preserve these rights and should, therefore, be given the
relevant authority to do so. Usually, proponents of this theory
support the proposition “that the Supreme Court should give
content to the Constitution’s open-ended provisions by identifying
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989) (“While it may indeed be unrealistic to
have substantial confidence that judges and lawyers will find the correct historical answer to
such refined questions of original intent as the precise content of ‘the executive Power,’ for the
vast majority of questions the answer is clear.”); Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original
Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986) (“[O]riginal intent is
the only legitimate basis for constitutional decisionmaking.”).
20. See Powell, supra note 14, at 948.
21. For an interesting post-9/11 example of this, see Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229, 2244–51 (2008). There, after trying to discern whether the Framers would have
intended for the writ of habeas corpus to extend to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the Court
declined to “infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence on
point.” Id. at 2251.
22. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 263.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 255–59.

1343

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/20/2010 1:00:38 PM

2010

and enforcing upon the political branches those values that are, by
one formula or another, truly important or fundamental.”25 In
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, for example, a plurality of the Court noted that
“[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role
for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”26
Unfortunately, this approach also fails to fully address issues
related to the separation of powers. For one thing, because there is
no clear means of determining which values are essential, decisionmakers “can make serious mistakes in identifying fundamental
rights.”27 One scholar has sardonically suggested, for instance, that
the preeminent example of this is Lochner v. New York, when the
Supreme Court held that the right of bakers to work more than sixty
hours per week was fundamental.28 Decisions of this nature are
indicative of the difficulties surrounding attempts to precisely discern
fundamental rights, and can lead to skepticism that they even exist.
Even more challenging, those rights generally thought of as
fundamental are often in conflict with one another and there is no
clear means of establishing a hierarchy as to which right is more
fundamental. “[V]ague, idealized institutions” thus “easily support
polar opposite constitutional responses” to the question of how best
to protect these essential values.29 The institutional tensions related
to detainee issues provide a perfect example of this, with the
President operating to protect the liberty and security of the general
American public and the Supreme Court intervening to check
executive authority and preserve individual liberties.30 This conflict
25. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 43
(1980) (emphasis added); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 1943-1946 (4th ed. 1873) (“When life and liberty are in question
there must in every instance be judicial proceedings . . . .”).
26. 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
27. DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH
AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE
175 (2007).
28. Id.
29. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 43.
30. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2279 (2008) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (responding to the dissenters’ claim that the majority had engaged in
“triumphalism” by asserting that the authority of the executive “is necessarily limited by habeas
corpus jurisdiction to enquire into the legality of executive detention”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 677 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for interrupting
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highlights the fact that the “choice of social goals or values is
insufficient to tell us [much] about law and public policy.”31
C. Law and Economics
Another approach to deciding who decides has been put forth by
legal economists. While law and economics is a diverse and complex
field, as relevant here, one of the discipline’s primary objectives is to
maximize efficiency.32 Thus, in making determinations about which
institution should be given authority to make various decisions, legal
economists posit that the distribution should be based on a
comparison of associated institutional costs. Law and economics was
accordingly an early predecessor to institutional choice, since
“[t]ransaction cost economics is inherently comparative.”33
As an example, one might examine the costs associated with
access to different institutions in order to determine which could
most efficiently address a particular matter. Scholars have noted, for
instance, that though Congress is “responsive to public pressure as
reflected through the media and constituents,” legislative access
usually depends on campaign contributions and political support.34
Conversely, while not influenced by such interests groups, courts
have their own access costs given the time and expense associated
with the litigation process.35 The point, according to legal
economists, is to evaluate the legal issue at hand to determine which
institution could address it most efficiently in light of these costs.
Despite the fact that law and economics analysis may result in the
most efficient solution to a problem, the discipline has been widely
criticized. Paramount among the critiques is the observation that

military commissions the President had deemed necessary for national security); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528 (2004) (acknowledging “the tension that often exists between
the autonomy that the Government asserts is necessary in order to pursue effectively a
particular goal and the process that a citizen contends he is due before he is deprived of a
constitutional right”).
31. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 271.
32. See Margaret Oppenheimer & Nicholas Mercuro, Law and Economics: Making the
Case for a Broader Approach, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC
APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 3, 5 (Margaret Oppenheimer & Nicholas
Mercuro eds., 2005).
33. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1413 (1996).
34. Yoo, supra note 3, at 592.
35. Id.
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efficiency alone fails to account for principles of social justice.36 In
other words, while it may be more costly for one particular
institution to address a legal challenge, that institution may
nevertheless offer other compelling advantages. Similarly, law and
economics has also been disparaged for commodifying legal rights.37
If rights truly are “fundamental,” it would thus be inappropriate to
withhold them solely in the name of efficiency. Finally, detractors
also note that, often, there is a failure to adequately capture all
relevant costs and, consequently, sole reliance on an efficiency
calculus inaccurately skews the decision allocation process.38 For
these reasons, law and economics as a mechanism to decide who
decides ultimately fails to provide wholly adequate guidance to those
charged with resolving these difficult issues.
D. Institutional Choice
While the aforementioned approaches have failed to
independently address the issue of “who decides,” each offers
valuable insight into the process of allocating decision-making
authority. In an effort to capture and build on those insights, “a
new, unified methodology for legal scholarship based on the analysis
of institutions” emerged in the mid-1990s.39 Essentially, institutional
analysis calls for an examination of how various legal institutions
operate and which would therefore be best suited to pursue certain
objectives.40 Institutional choice theorists claim that achieving
desired results occurs only if decision-making authority related to
those goals is allocated to the “right” institution.41 The
organizations relevant to this analysis depend on the legal issue at
hand, but may include the market, judiciary, executive, legislature,
administrative agencies, and perhaps even the international
36. See Duncan Kennedy, Law and Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal
Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 470–71 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998).
37. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
367, 367–68 (2009).
38. See Bernadette Atuahene, Things Fall Apart: The Illegitimacy of Property Rights in
the Context of Past Property Theft, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 860 (2009).
39. Rubin, supra note 33, at 1424.
40. Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of
Takings, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 591, 593 (1998).
41. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 5 (“It is institutional choice that connects goals with
their legal or public policy results.”).
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community. Once the relevant institutions are identified, their
particular competencies must be examined in order to determine
which can appropriately address any given legal quandary. For
present purposes, an understanding of the more widely recognized
institutional competencies of the executive, legislative, and judiciary
is important.
1. The executive
Generally, the principal advantages of executive authority are that
it can be exercised quickly, flexibly, and decisively.42 Moreover, given
the centralized power of the executive branch, its actions are more
unified, which is especially important in managing foreign affairs.43
In times of war, the executive is often seen as the primary
institutional actor because of the President’s constitutional role as
commander-in-chief.44 Likewise, the executive is also generally
presumed to be more informed about national security and foreign
affairs issues. “Thus, unless Congress specifically has provided
otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon
the authority of the Executive in military and national security
affairs.”45 This, of course, is counterbalanced by the fact that, in light
of electoral politics, executive action is tempered by popular will.

42. See JAMES M. MCCORMICK, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY & PROCESS 293–94
(2010).
43. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“The Founders intended that the President have primary responsibility—along with the
necessary power—to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign
relations. They did so principally because the structural advantages of a unitary Executive are
essential in these domains.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
319 (1936) (“In th[e] vast external realm [of foreign affairs], with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation.”); Yoo, supra note 3, at 598.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Even in this area, there is debate, of course, as to how far
inherent presidential authority extends. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 494 (2008);
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
45. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (emphasis added). But see
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (noting that the Supreme Court has “long since made clear that a
state of war is not a blank check for the President”).
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Indeed, “the President’s accountability to the popular will is the best
means of ensuring that he will do a decent job.”46
However, for all the advantages of executive authority there are
several features that can be troubling. While centralized power may
be useful, for instance, insofar as it results in unified action, this
centralization also makes the executive authority ripe for abuse. As
one Supreme Court Justice aptly noted, “though we live under the
form of a republic we [can be] in fact under the absolute rule of a
single man.”47 Relatedly, unified authority may also lead to secretive
policymaking and associated abuses—especially those directed
against minorities.48 For an example of this, one need not look
beyond the war on terror. In late 2005, The New York Times broke a
story regarding the executive decision to permit the National
Security Agency to conduct warrantless wiretaps in the aftermath of
9/11.49 While there were, perhaps, some members of Congress who
were at least marginally aware of the program,50 by and large
members expressed outrage at being “rolled” by the executive.51
This example highlights the fact that while the executive has the

46. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 474 (1973) (arguing
also that “the President’s duty is not to ignore and override popular concerns but to
acknowledge and heed them”).
47. Letter from Justice Joseph Story to Hon. Judge Fay (Feb. 18, 1834), in 2 LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, at 154 (William W. Story ed., 1851). See also Obama, supra note
1 (“In our constitutional system, prolonged detention should not be the decision of any one
man.”).
48. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 46, at xx–xxi.
49. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
50. Id. (noting that while it was unclear precisely “how much the members of Congress
were told about the . . . program,” at least a few had been generally informed of it).
51. See, e.g., Turning Spy Satellites on the Homeland: The Privacy and Civil Liberties
Implications of the National Applications Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec., 110th Cong. 59 (2007) (statement of Hon. Jane Harman, Member, H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec.). More fully, Rep. Harman observed that “we have been rolled on the
Terrorist Surveillance Program in Congress. That thing was full blown before I as a member of
the Gang of Eight was briefed on its operations.” Id. Rep. Harman also stated that the Bush
administration “feels free to disregard the law Congress passes in exercising the President’s
Commander in Chief authorities.” Id. (The Gang of Eight includes “the Speaker and Minority
Leader of the House, the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate, and the Chairmen and
Ranking Members of the Congressional Intelligence Committees.” REP. JOHN C. CONYERS,
JR., THE HIGH CRIMES OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND A BLUEPRINT FOR
IMPEACHMENT: DECEPTION, MANIPULATION, TORTURE, RETRIBUTION, ILLEGAL
SURVEILLANCE, AND COVER-UPS 142 (2007)).
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ability to quickly react to threats, the lack of deliberation may lead to
uninformed—and perhaps even unconstitutional—responses.52
2. The legislature
By contrast, one of the strengths of the legislature is that its
processes may lead to more deliberative and informed decisionmaking. For example, Congress can call upon executive officials and
other experts to conduct studies or hearings before enacting
legislation.53 This arguably results in the avoidance of “imprudent
wars that may be too costly and ineffective.”54 John Hart Ely has
further argued that, as relating to the legislature’s constitutional role
in war-making, “the point [is] not to exclude the executive from the
decision—if the president’s not on board we’re not going to have
much of a war—but rather to ‘clog’ the road to combat by requiring
the concurrence of a number of people of various points of view.”55
Another obvious advantage of the legislature is that, like the
executive, it is designed to be responsive to popular will. In fact, the
actions of legislators are thought to be even more representative,
since they are more closely connected to the people.56 Finally,
because they too are subject to the vagaries of the electoral process,
the presumption is that legislators’ efforts will generally serve to
advance the common good.57
Again, however, though the Framers may have envisioned that
constitutional design would eliminate biases within the legislature,
the reality is that the institution’s operations often do fall prey to
them. Most prominently, legislators have been criticized for
52. See, e.g., Benham Gharagozli, War of Words or a Regional Disaster? The (Il)legality
of Israeli and Iranian Military Options, 33 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 203, 210
(2010) (“[T]he Bush Doctrine is not only unnecessary and dangerous as a matter of public
policy, but is also illegal.”); Dennis Jett, Thoughts on the Changing Face of International Law,
21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 161, 167 (2009) (“The Bush administration undoubtedly used torture and
committed other illegal acts during its so-called war on terror.”).
53. Yoo, supra note 3, at 593.
54. Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J.
2512, 2516 (2006). These authors ultimately argue, however, that “[a] cursory review of
previous American wars does not suggest that requiring congressional authorization before the
use of force invariably produces better decision-making.” Id. at 2517.
55. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 4 (1993).
56. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture:
Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1281 (2009).
57. Rubin, supra note 33, at 1397.
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pandering to minority interest groups at the expense of the public’s
welfare.58 Thus, a concentrated few are overrepresented in the
eventual outcomes of legislative processes.59 Alternatively, the
legislature may also be overly influenced by the “power of
majoritarian influence [that] can severely skew political results and
produce what might be termed majoritarian bias, [or] the
overrepresentation of the many.”60 In these cases, though the
minority usually suffers the greatest harm, “it simply cannot
overcome the power of the majority to outvote them,” either
because the minority’s voting polity is simply not large enough or
because its members are altogether excluded from the voting
process.61 Ultimately, if the legislative process suffers from either
minoritarian or majoritarian bias, the “best” legislation is arguably
sacrificed in order to satisfy a particular constituency.62
3. The judiciary
Given the biases just noted, the judiciary is often thought to
protect individual liberty interests—especially of those in the
minority—better than other institutions.63 The primary reason for
this is that “courts are designed to be independent from politics, to
passively allow parties to drive the litigation, and to receive
information in highly formal ways through litigation. These
58. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 3, at 592 (“It is generally thought that interest groups
must provide campaign contributions or political support in order to attain access to political
leaders . . . .”).
59. See KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 55–56.
60. Id. at 54.
61. L. Song Richardson, Convicting the Innocent in Transnational Criminal Cases: A
Comparative Institutional Analysis Approach to the Problem, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 62, 93–
94 (2008).
62. It is worth noting, however, that these processes may in fact create the “best”
legislation. Whether or not this is true depends, of course, on the values one expects to be
preserved by the legislative process.
63. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (quoting United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)) (“[O]ne aspect of the judiciary’s
role under the Equal Protection Clause [may be] to protect ‘discrete and insular minorities’
from majoritarian prejudice or indifference . . . .”); Tonja Jacobi, The Role of Politics and
Economics in Explaining Variations in Litigation Rates in the U.S. States, 38 J. LEGAL STUD.
205, 210 (2009) (“[T]he judiciary often protects minorities and disadvantaged groups.”);
Scott D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution, and the History of Ideas, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1067,
1099 (2008) (“The independent judiciary embodied in the U.S. Constitution, at least
according to most non-popular constitutionalist accounts, is designed to protect individuals
and minorities from overreaching by the majority.”).
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characteristics may make courts more neutral in their decision
making and fairer in their attitude toward defendants or detainees.”64
To the extent that its decisions are publicly available, and that
citizens can witness proceedings, the judiciary’s decision-making
process is also more transparent than that of the political branches.65
Lastly, the judiciary is also generally thought to be more deliberative
in its intervention and decision-making processes, which arguably
leads to better results.66
Conversely, however, the deliberativeness of the judiciary may
make it ill-suited for dealing with certain issues—especially those
surrounding national security and war-making. On the one hand, the
contemplative approach of the judiciary may fail in times of crisis
because such circumstances require rapid and agile responses to
address threats faced by the nation. On the other hand, once the
judiciary does choose to intervene, its margin for error is arguably
smaller than that of other branches, since opportunities for selfcorrection will be available with far less frequency.67 The judiciary’s
purposive operations thus create situations where “[j]udicial errors or
deviations from policy may take years to reverse or may even go
entirely uncorrected.”68 Beyond issues of deliberativeness, the
judiciary is also characterized as largely lacking in competence to
address national security matters.69 This incompetence springs from
the fact that judges are generalists and that many issues are political
questions best left to other branches.70 Moreover, even if they
possessed such competence, the relative lack of judicial resources
64. Yoo, supra note 3, at 591.
65. See Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does it Mean?, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 293, 301–
02 (2009) (“The judiciary plays an essential role in giving life to other values, such as
predictability and transparency.”).
66. See, e.g., Roger C. Hartley, Congressional Devolution of Immigration Policymaking:
A Separation of Powers Critique, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 93, 157 (2007) (“The
judiciary benefits . . . from a more reflective, deliberative lawmaking process.”).
67. Yoo, supra note 3, at 599.
68. Id.
69. Competence here is defined as the ability of judges “to investigate, understand, and
make the substantive social decisions that may come to them.” KOMESAR, supra note 7, at
138. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276–77 (2008) (“Unlike the President and
some designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor most federal
judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation
and its people.”); Yoo, supra note 3, at 597; KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 138–42. But see
Obama, supra note 1 (“Some have derided our federal courts as incapable of handling trials of
terrorists. They are wrong.”).
70. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Yoo, supra note 3, at 597.
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makes it such that courts “cannot call their own number too
often.”71 Finally, because the judiciary is often seen as the
protectorate of minorities, it is frequently placed in the unenviable
position of having to adjudicate issues related to fundamental rights.
As alluded to above, defining such rights, and resolving conflicts
between them, is extremely difficult, and courts’ attempts to do so
have created skepticism about the actual neutrality of the judiciary.72
In sum, institutional choice analysts would suggest that decisionmaking authority for any specific issue ought to be allocated in light
of these various institutional competencies. But while the theory has
advanced legal scholarship by merging many of the underlying
principles of the approaches outlined previously, it has also been the
subject of criticism.73 Most notably, Komesar has asserted that
“[s]implistic, frictionless institutional specifications always make
institutional choice trivial and empty.”74 In other words, institutional
choice alone fails because it views the decision-making process
through the lens of “single institutionalism,” or, as a process that
merely lists the advantages of one institution without making
comparisons between them.75 This analysis ultimately proves fruitless,
since “[s]imply cataloging the available institutions without engaging
in any comparison amongst them leaves unanswered the questions of
which institution will best serve the desired policy.”76
III. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Komesar developed comparative institutional analysis to fill the
vacuum left by these previous theories. In contrast to simple
institutional choice, Komesar’s theory calls for comparisons between

71. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 250.
72. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“One cannot
help but think, after surveying the modest practical results of the majority’s ambitious opinion,
that this decision is not really about the detainees at all, but about control of federal policy
regarding enemy combatants.”).
73. See Richardson, supra note 61, at 69–70 (suggesting that institutional choice alone
is insufficient, because “all institutions can fail under similar circumstances,” so a comparative
view is necessary “to determine which is least likely to fail in a given context”).
74. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 39.
75. Id. at 199. For an important example of this, see Yoo, supra note 3, at 590–600.
There, Yoo essentially offers a litany of reasons explaining why the judiciary lacks the capacity
to address national security issues. While he calls his institutional analysis “comparative,” there
is no real indication as to why another branch would be better at addressing such matters. Id.
76. Richardson, supra note 61, at 73 (emphasis added).
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institutions to determine which would be best suited to address a
particular legal problem under a specific set of circumstances.
“Under comparative institutional analysis, the appropriate question is
not whether a particular institution works better in one setting than
in another. Rather, the correct question is whether, in any given
setting, one institution is better or worse than its available
alternatives.”77 As suggested by the title of his book Imperfect
Alternatives, Komesar begins with the assumption that every
institution has its own malfunctions, and is therefore imperfect.78 In
light of these malfunctions, deciding who decides becomes a choice
of which institution, imperfect though it may be, has the highest
likelihood of achieving the desired result.
A full appreciation of the utility of comparative institutional
analysis theory can be arrived at through a more thorough
examination of some of the institutional malfunctions discussed
above.79 As explained by Ely:
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2)
though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives
beholden to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging
some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to
recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that
minority the protection afforded other groups by a representative
system.80

Given these circumstances, Ely asserts that the political process is
simply incapable of policing itself; therefore, the judiciary’s role is
vital. While this conclusion seems intuitive, it rests on precisely the
type of reasoning comparative institutional analysis challenges as
overly simplistic. Such frictionless assessments “simply do not work
in the complex world of institutional choice”81 because the judiciary
itself also has malfunctions which ought to be accounted for. The
question thus becomes how the impact of these malfunctions can be
quantified and relatively compared so that the institution with the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 70.
KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 6.
See supra notes 47–76 and accompanying text.
ELY, supra note 25, at 103.
KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 201.
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best chance of reaching the desired result is given the necessary
authority to do so.
When framed this way, it is easy to see why deciding who decides
is so complex and situationally dependent. As one commentator has
fittingly noted, society “cannot decide whether courts or legislatures
can do a job better, in the abstract.”82 Indeed, though fundamental
rights analysis on its own fails to entirely address questions about
who should decide, the fact remains that even under comparative
institutional analysis, the decision-making process will always be
driven by the values people hope to protect. “One must know what
the job is, [and] what values and goals one is trying to achieve or
protect. Only then can one discuss whether people selected and
sheltered—as judges are—make preferable decision makers to, say,
people elected and exposed—as legislators are.”83
IV. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS & DETAINEE LEGAL
ISSUES
This Part thus begins with the assumption that “the job” is to
determine, using comparative institutional analysis principles, which
institution within the U.S. government was best postured to address
detainee issues at various points in the aftermath of 9/11. As
mentioned above, this requires acknowledgement of the goals and
values the American people wished to protect. Though there was no
doubt some divergence amidst such a large polity, the principles of
“freedom, fairness, equality, and dignity”84 will serve as guideposts
for this analysis since the President has stated that these goals should
drive U.S. policy.85 Beyond recognizing those values, however, one
must also have an appreciation for the development of detainee
policies, and the institutional malfunctions evident throughout their
creation.

82. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to
the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2124 (2003).
83. Id. at 2124–25.
84. Obama, supra note 1.
85. Importantly, these values exist in the American psyche in both the collective and
individual sense, so individual liberty must be balanced against collective liberty interests
preserved through national security.
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A. Legal Framework for Detainee Issues

One week after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
granting the President authority “to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks . . . .”86 Though the AUMF did not explicitly authorize
detention of combatants captured on the battlefield, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.87 Recognizing the
institutional tension created by its involvement in national security
issues,88 however, the Court “answer[ed] only the narrow question”
of whether those individuals like Hamdi—a U.S. citizen captured in
a combat zone—could be detained pursuant to the AUMF.89
Because the plurality determined that such detentions were
fundamentally incident to war-making, and that “[a] citizen, no less
than an alien,”90 could represent a force hostile to the United States,
the majority held that Congress had inherently authorized such
detentions via the AUMF.91 Just as importantly, the Court also
noted that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President when
it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”92 Accordingly, the
Court held that “due process demands some system for a citizendetainee to refute his classification” as an enemy combatant.93 Thus,
while acknowledging the vital interest of the government to protect
national security, the Court also asserted that “history and common
sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the
potential to become a means for oppression and abuse.”94

86. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
87. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
88. Id. at 520 (“We recognize that the national security underpinnings of the ‘war on
terror,’ although crucially important, are broad and malleable.”).
89. Id. at 516.
90. Id. at 519.
91. Id. at 518. Given the statutory authority, the Court declined to address the
constitutional question of whether such authorization was necessary in light of inherent
authority the President may have as commander-in-chief.
92. Id. at 536.
93. Id. at 537.
94. Id. at 530.
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The same day, the Court issued a similarly reasoned opinion in
Rasul v. Bush.95 In Rasul, the majority held that federal courts had
jurisdiction to adjudicate habeas corpus petitions filed by foreign
nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.96 After a lengthy
historical review of the purpose of the writ, the Court reached its
conclusion based on the fact that “habeas corpus has served as a
means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in
that context that its protections have been strongest.”97 In other
words, the Court again appeared to rest its conclusion on its
perceived duty to serve as a check against executive overreach. Such
reasoning was criticized, however, by the dissenters.98 They argued
that, in light of Congress’s superior institutional competence over
national security issues, Congress, rather than the Court, should have
addressed any perceived executive overreach.99 The fact that it failed
to do so, the dissenters asserted, should have served as a signal that
Congress evidently approved of the President’s actions.100
Both the executive and legislature responded swiftly to these
decisions. On July 7, 2004, just days after the Hamdi and Rasul
decisions, the executive issued an order establishing procedures
whereby detainees could challenge their designation as enemy
combatants.101 To effect this purpose, the order created Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which essentially incorporated
into their operational procedures the minimal due process
protections the Court had required in Hamdi.102 Likewise, in 2005,
Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), essentially
overruling Rasul by statutorily stripping federal courts of jurisdiction

95. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
96. Id. at 485.
97. Id. at 474 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)).
98. Id. at 488–506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined in dissent by Justices
Rehnquist and Thomas.
99. See id. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In fact, during oral argument, Justice Scalia had
rhetorically asked: “Can we hold hearings to determine the problems that are bothering you? .
. . We can’t call witnesses and see what the real problems are, can we, in creating this new
substantive rule that we are going to let the courts create. Congress could do all that, though,
couldn’t it?” Transcript of Record at 45–46, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03334).
100. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary
of the Navy (July 7, 2004) (http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf).
102. Id.
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to hear habeas petitions filed by foreign nationals detained at
Guantanamo Bay.103
What apparently was not clear, however, was whether the DTA
applied to cases pending at the time of its passage. In Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the Court answered this question with a resounding
“no.”104 Perhaps more importantly, Hamdan also established that
the military commissions that had been created to try detainees
violated federal law largely because of their procedural departures
from the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Geneva
Conventions.105 While the Court accepted that the AUMF had
“activated the President’s war powers . . . includ[ing] the authority
to convene military commissions,” it found no indication that either
the AUMF or DTA authorized an approach denying procedural
safeguards contained in standard military commissions.106
Again, Congress responded with great haste, passing the Military
Commissions Act (MCA) within four months of the Hamdan
decision.107 In addition to authorizing the military commissions that
the executive had established for the war on terror, the MCA also
clarified that federal courts were stripped of jurisdiction to hear
habeas petitions of Guantanamo detainees, regardless of when their
cases were filed.108 Notably, however, even as the MCA was being
debated, several senators expressed concern about the bill.109 One
specifically noted that the United States had lost its “moral
compass,” while another stated that, though the MCA was “patently
unconstitutional on its face,” he would nevertheless vote for the bill
since “the court [would] clean it up.”110

103. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
104. 548 U.S. 577, 584 n.15 (2006).
105. Id. at 567.
106. Id. at 594.
107. Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
108. Id.
109. Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee Bill Backed by
Bush, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at A1.
110. Id. In fact, one author has argued that “[i]n passing the MCA, Congress
demonstrated that it does not just tolerate, but depends upon, the Court to be the primary, if
not exclusive, interpreter and guardian of the Constitution, at least in the national-security
context.” Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 284 (2008).
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In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court did in fact clean it up.111 While
the scope of the case precluded analysis of the validity of the military
commissions authorized by the MCA, it did allow the Court to
review the constitutionality of the Act’s denial of detainees’ rights to
the writ of habeas corpus.112 In large part, the holding rested on the
majority’s belief that the procedures related to the CSRTs did not
provide adequate procedural protections to replace traditional habeas
petitions.113 Thus, the Court stated that:
Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say,
after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral
review is most pressing. A criminal conviction in the usual course
occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the
outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure its own
independence. These dynamics are not inherent in executive
detention orders or executive review procedures.114

Affirming that the Suspension Clause was “designed to protect
against . . . cyclical abuses”115 and that the writ of habeas corpus is
“the surest safeguard of liberty,”116 the Court held that Congress’s
attempt to circumvent it via the MCA was unconstitutional.117
Several issues remain unlitigated, but it is, of course, this
institutional ping-pong that has created skepticism about the
development of legal policies related to detainee issues. In the midst
of the fog of war, no single institution seemed to know precisely
what was appropriate or where to draw lines as to decision-making
authority. The Court’s decisions “[gave] rise to the popular notion
that the judiciary had thoroughly rebuked the executive branch,”118
though the Court itself often seemed reluctant to engage in
constitutional issues seemingly within its purview. Beyond the fact
that the various branches were perhaps operating to achieve different
goals, another explanation for this tension rests in the various
malfunctions at play during the development of detainee policies.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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Yoo, supra note 3, at 573.
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B. Institutional Malfunctions Related to Detainee Issues

Komesar has largely limited his analysis of malfunctions to those
that occur within the market, or those within the political process
that develop because of majoritarian and minoritarian biases.
Though majoritarian biases have indeed played an instrumental role
in the institutional frictions surrounding detainee policies, other
malfunctions not specifically identified by Komesar also appear to
have been important. This Part explores those malfunctions in order
to set the stage for analyzing the comparative advantage of having
any particular branch intervene—at any particular time—in detainee
issues.
1. Majoritarian biases
One of the most obvious malfunctions evident in the creation of
detainee legal policies has been the extreme majoritarian bias against
detainees within the government’s political branches. This is not
wholly surprising, given that those incarcerated were almost
exclusively marginalized out of the political processes. While groups
like the American Civil Liberties Union tried to lobby for detainee
rights,119 their efforts evidently held little immediate sway over the
legislature and executive. A comparison can be drawn to the general
criminal defense lobby, about which one commentator said: “They
could not credibly threaten activation of the majority. While they
could bring politicians’ attention to the risk of convicting the
innocent . . . legislators are aware that most citizens believe that
those accused of crime have too many rights.”120 Likewise, it is
hardly surprising that “[i]n the four months following 9/11, 97
percent of all bills, resolutions, and amendments proposed by
Congress, totaling more than 450 measures, were related to
terrorism.”121
Indeed, whatever deliberativeness may otherwise be attributable
to Congress, in the midst of crisis legislators do not generally seem
interested in holding hearings and gathering facts. Nothing has been
more indicative of this disinterest during the war on terror than the
speed with which Congress enacted the AUMF—just seven days
119. See American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org/national-security/johnadams-project-american-values (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
120. Richardson, supra note 61, at 96.
121. Donohue, supra note 2, at 370 (citations omitted).
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after the September 11th attacks. The primary explanation for this
haste is that “at the time of an attack governments recalculate the
‘security versus freedom’ framework . . . [and] the perceived security
risks posed by terrorism dramatically increases and eclipses other
types of security concerns (such as security from undue government
interference or arbitrary power).”122 Moreover, the public at large
likely makes the same calculation, and given electoral concerns, the
majoritarian bias thrives.
2. Conflicts of interest
In somewhat related fashion, various conflicts of interests within
institutional actors have created their own malfunctions as the
government has created detainee policies. For example, the executive
as commander-in-chief has the responsibility of protecting national
security, and also of protecting the principles of individual liberty
embodied by the Constitution. In light of the aforementioned
majoritarian bias, and as evidenced by the Bush Administration’s
detainee policies, the executive inclination appears to have been to
err on the side of acting as commander-in-chief.123 This tension led
Justice Souter in his Hamdi concurrence to observe that “[f]or
reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Government
asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest
the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the will
to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory.”124
Similarly, members of Congress affirm an oath that they will
defend the Constitution against both foreign and domestic
enemies.125 As noted above, in times of crisis legislators have a
proclivity of trying to sustain this oath by passing hasty and extreme
statutes.126 “[L]egislators hedge” against checking the President
because “they are reluctant to hamstring the executive.”127
Accordingly, they aggressively pass what they think will be temporary

122. Id. at 371–72.
123. For a similar argument related to the executive’s role as chief law enforcement
officer, see Richardson, supra note 61, at 102.
124. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (Souter, J., concurring).
125. U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/
Oath_Office.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
126. Donohue, supra note 2, at 371–72.
127. Id. at 372.
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measures in order to provide the executive the flexibility it needs.128
Once these laws are enacted, though, they are difficult to repeal.129
“New provisions thus become the baseline upon which further
measures build to expand the executive authority and promise
citizens more security at the expense of civil liberties.”130 Within the
context of war on terror detentions this can be seen in the language
authorized by Congress in the AUMF. More to the point, the
AUMF’s sweeping grant authorizing the President to “use all
necessary and appropriate force”131 in responding to the 9/11
attacks has been a nagging thorn for those seeking protection from
executive dictates.132
3. Differing institutional foci
Flowing from these principles is the idea that the executive and
legislature have a different focus than the judiciary. While judicial
decisions obviously have effect beyond the litigants of any particular
case, the cases and controversies requirement serves largely to ensure
that the Court is focused on an individual’s personal liberties. Even
the dissenters in Boumediene, who claimed that the majority sought
“control of federal policy regarding enemy combatants,”
acknowledged that the decision was modest in other ways.133 On the
other hand, the legislature and executive necessarily have a wider
constituency and therefore a broader focus. This of course is not to
suggest that one is, in some abstract sense, better, but it does serve
to highlight that in different situations one institution may be better
situated to address a certain issue in light of its particular institutional
focus.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 372–73.
131. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001) (emphasis added).
132. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 587 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the plurality “qualifies its recognition of the President’s authority [via the
AUMF] to detain combatants in the war on terrorism” in ways inconsistent with the AUMF
and other legal precedent).
133. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2279 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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4. Lack of competency
A final set of systemic malfunctions worth mentioning is that
each institution inherently possesses a certain ignorance regarding
the issues surrounding the war on terror. As Richard Posner has said,
“[j]udges aren’t supposed to know much about national security.”134
For that reason, and others already explored,135 courts are often
reluctant to engage in legal challenges related to national security,
even though it may otherwise be prudent for them to do so. This
obviously creates a situation, however, where the executive and
legislature have free reign to engage in what may be illegal activity.
From a more charitable perspective, even those actors operating in
good-faith may also overstep constitutional authority based on a
mistaken belief as to the precise contours of the law. The fact that
the judicial opinions cited above were so divisive for the Court
should be an indication that these issues were not easily resolvable,
especially to those lacking the competence of the judiciary over
constitutional interpretation.
C. So, Who Should Have Decided?
“For the legal process school, institutions possessed fixed
identity, and the task of assigning roles to them was like a game of
animal, vegetable, or mineral.”136 As evidenced by the post-9/11
institutional malfunctions, however, comparative institutional
analysis suggests that there was no perfect solution as to which
branch of government should have addressed detainee issues at any
given moment in the aftermath of 9/11. Thus, while many believe
the Court should have interjected itself more aggressively to protect
individual liberties, the judiciary’s own limitations prove that
“[i]nstitutional superiority is not always obvious, and superiority is
often a choice of bad over worse.”137 With this perspective, though
the development of detainee legal policies at times appeared
meandering and unclear, the system of checks and balances appears
to have worked precisely as it should have.

134. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 37 (2006).
135. See supra notes 63–76 and accompanying text.
136. Rubin, supra note 33, at 1428.
137. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 255.
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1. September 11th and the AUMF
In the first instance, it seems imminently appropriate for the
executive to be vested with a certain degree of authority to act
independently and without delay in times of national crisis. While in
normal circumstances such aggressive responses as those embodied
in President Bush’s detainee policies may prove objectionable, 9/11
spawned an “unconventional war,”138 the precise parameters of
which were immediately unclear even to those with the most
national security competence. Moreover, although the President may
possess inherent constitutional authority to act in such true
emergencies,139 the fact is that here, Congress had granted the
executive sweeping authority to address the national threat via the
AUMF.140
All of this seems to have rightly occurred without judicial
intervention, because there is nothing to suggest that, up to that
point, the courts could have done a better job of meeting the twin
goals of protecting national security and preserving civil liberties.
Also, given the judiciary’s general incompetence in dealing with
national security policy, it seems prudent to have expected the
judiciary to yield to the executive and legislature in the immediate
aftermath of a related threat. This is because the “efficacy—the
consequences generally—of a security measure adopted to deal with
a novel threat cannot be determined if the measure is blocked early
on by a constitutional interpretation. The post-9/11 responses to
the newly apprehended terrorist threat [were] entitled to a chance to
prove themselves—good or bad.”141
2. Hamdi and Rasul
Eventually, though, detentions became less abstract matters of
national security policy and more individualized infringements on
personal liberties. Hamdi was no longer a nameless, faceless,
potential terrorist, but rather a U.S. citizen incarcerated for over two

138. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004).
139. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
140. Perhaps Congress’s authorization was not necessary as an antecedent to action, but
it certainly imbued the executive’s activity with far more legitimacy. See id.
141. POSNER, supra note 134, at 37.
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years without formal charges or proceedings.142 Likewise, by the time
of their case, the petitioners in Rasul had been detained at
Guantanamo Bay for over two years without facing charges.143 Any
institutional advantage provided by the executive’s ability to quickly
comprehend and respond to a national security threat became less
meaningful as detentions like those represented in Hamdi and Rasul
dragged on. Moreover, despite cries to the contrary, the Court went
to great lengths to limit the scope of its holdings. Though it
determined in Hamdi, for example, that some sort of due process
was required for detentions, it explicitly indicated that given the
exigencies of war “enemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to
alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time
of ongoing military conflict.”144 In further recognition of the
executive’s authority over war-making, the Court also avoided the
more extreme question potentially presented by Rasul as to what
process may be due those captured and incarcerated within the
combat zone itself. But despite the Court’s reservations in those
areas, its intervention became necessary for Guantanamo detainees
because “as the period of detention stretch[ed] from months to
years, the case for continued detention to meet military exigencies
[became] weaker.”145
Thus, comparative institutional analysis seems to indicate that
judicial intervention was appropriate at the time of Hamdi and
Rasul. Obviously the Court’s involvement advanced the goal of
protecting individual liberty. On the other hand, as the Court itself
noted, it was unlikely that the basic process called for by the majority
in Hamdi, or the habeas reviews mandated in Rasul, would “have
the dire impact on the central functions of warmaking that the
Government forecasts.”146 While the dissenters criticized the
judiciary for making such forecasts in light of the Court’s
institutional incompetence in national security matters, the criticism
is misplaced. Simply because judges are generalists (by design) does
not imply that they are incapable of becoming competent. In fact,
the very framework under which the judicial system operates is one
in which a litigant must convincingly prove his case to the trier of
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
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fact. To the extent that the executive truly believed that judicial
interference would outweigh individual liberty interests, it simply
failed to prove it. Indeed, this is likely exactly what happened, given
that the executive itself could not precisely measure any potential
threat posed by providing the limited procedural protections called
for in these cases. In contrast, however, the threat to individual
liberties was perfectly clear. As the Hamdi Court notes, “detention
could last for the rest of [a detainee’s] life.”147 While such extreme
measures may have been appropriate in the immediate aftermath of
9/11, after two years the least the Court could do was impose
minimal procedural requirements on the executive.
Finally, while the issues underlying Hamdi and Rasul could
arguably have been left to the political processes of the executive and
legislature, as highlighted above, malfunctions within those systems
made such reliance impractical. In a majoritarian system, minorities
are marginalized and lack the voice necessary to promote change.
Judicial intervention may therefore be necessary when the
malfunctions are so egregious—as here—that change cannot wait for
the voting cycle or for the majority to become more informed or
enlightened.
3. Hamdan and Boumediene
As with Hamdi and Rasul, the tipping point for judicial
intervention in Hamdan and Boumediene seems to have been
connected to the length of both the war on terror and the detainees’
incarceration. By the time his case was decided in 2006, Hamdan
had been in U.S. custody for nearly five years. Moreover, the Court
noted that at least some of the petitioners in Boumediene had been
detained for six years “without the judicial oversight that habeas
corpus or an adequate substitute demands.”148 Perhaps just as
importantly, there was recognition by at least one member of the
Court that the nature of the war on terror was fundamentally
different than previous wars, and that institutional roles needed to
adapt accordingly. Specifically, Justice Kennedy noted that
“[b]ecause our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of limited
duration, it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war
powers undefined. If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose
147. Id. at 520.
148. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008).
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dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have
this luxury.”149 Despite this sweeping language, the Court still took a
measured approach. It did not, for example, address any potential
claim as to whether the CSRT procedures created after Hamdi were
sufficient to satisfy due process. Likewise, the Court did not ban the
use of military commissions altogether; it simply imposed a
requirement that they be conducted in accord with existing law.
Again, applying comparative institutional analysis principles to
these issues seems to suggest that it was wholly appropriate for the
Court to intervene as it did. This is perhaps especially true in light of
the fact that even some within the legislature were, by this time,
calling upon the Court to clean up the mess related to detainee
issues.150 Though times of crisis may in fact call for limitations on
civil liberties, the necessity for such detentions without process
inevitably became less pronounced as the war on terror continued.
On this account, it is critical to underscore that the Court never
suggested that detainees should be released or that there was
necessarily cause to question their detention. Instead, the Court
simply established that in order to preserve the nation’s goals of
liberty, equality, and justice, detainees should have been afforded an
opportunity to challenge their incarceration. With the executive’s
detention policies, as well as the DTA and MCA passed by Congress,
it is plainly obvious that no other institution was doing much to
preserve those values for the detainees themselves. Conversely, given
the limited nature of the Court’s involvement and the executive’s
continued bias toward aggressive protection of national security, the
appropriate balance seemed to have been struck. “Valid institutional
comparison calls upon the courts to function when they can do a
better job,”151 which is precisely what the Supreme Court did in
both Hamdan and Boumediene.
V. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, detainee issues during the war on terror have
presented vexing constitutional challenges to the institutional actors
within the U.S. legal system. Given the oft-competing goals of
protecting both national security and individual liberty, the
149. Id. at 2277.
150. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
151. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 149.
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development of the legal framework surrounding detainee issues
necessarily resulted in a certain degree of friction. While it is easy to
view this friction during times of crisis with cynicism, comparative
institutional analysis supports the proposition that in the aftermath of
9/11 the constitutional system operated essentially as it was
designed to operate. It has been observed that “[l]iberty and security
can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the
framework of the law.”152 This is not to suggest, however, that the
reconciliation process will always run smoothly. Instead, each
opportunity to “decide who decides” will require an analysis of the
institutional competencies of each organization and a comparison
between other alternatives. As evidenced by the development of the
law related to detainees, there is no perfect solution as to who
decides. But engaging in comparative institutional analysis can lead
to the conclusion that, in light of everything known about a
problem, the institution with the best chance of achieving the
entirety of a nation’s goals has been left to decide the problem.
Carla Crandall
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